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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we propose to measure inequality of educational achievements by 
constructing a Gini index on educational attainments. We then use the proposed 
measure to analyse the relationship between inequality in incomes and 
educational achievements (in terms of both the average attainments and its 
concentration). Even if theoretical considerations suggest a non-linear 
relationship between these two measures of inequality, actual data indicate that 
average years of education have a stronger negative impact on measured income 
inequality. Multivariate regressions also prove that, once we take into account 
the negative correlation between average educational achievement and its 
dispersion, the relationship between income inequality and average years of 
schooling is U-shaped, with a lower turning point at 6.5 years. Income 
inequality is also negatively related to per capita income and positively related 
to capital/output ratio and government expenditure in education.  
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Abstract 
In this paper we propose to measure inequality of educational 
achievements by constructing a Gini index on educational 
attainments. We then use the proposed measure to analyse the 
relationship between inequality in incomes and educational 
achievements (in terms of both the average attainments and its 
concentration). Even if theoretical considerations suggest a non-
linear relationship between these two measures of inequality, 
actual data indicate that average years of education have a 
stronger negative impact on measured income inequality. 
Multivariate regressions also prove that, once we take into 
account the negative correlation between average educational 
achievement and its dispersion, the relationship between 
income inequality and average years of schooling is U-shaped, 
                                                 
† The author thanks the comments of the participants to the workshop on “Inequality, 
growth and poverty under the Washington consensus” (Wider - Helsinki - July 1999) on 
an earlier version of this paper. He also thanks Meghnad Desai, David Soskice and an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments. Additional thanks to the audience of seminars 
held at Wissenschaftszentrum (Berlin), at the London School of Economics, at the SASE 
conference (London - June 2000), University of Pisa and University of Piacenza for helpful 
comments. Luca Flabbi provided excellent research assistantship. Financial support from 
the Ministry of University (MURST fondi ex-40%) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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with a lower turning point at 6.5 years. Income inequality is 
also negatively related to per capita income and positively 
related to capital/output ratio and government expenditure in 
education.  
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1. The issue 
 
In the literature on the relationship between income inequality 
and output growth, several authors claim that greater income 
inequality reduces growth.1 The empirical evidence indicates 
that one standard deviation decrease in income inequality 
raises the annual growth rate of product per capita by 0.5-0.8 
percentage points. However, there is no consensus about the 
underlying causal mechanism. On one side, a political economy 
mechanism calls for a role for redistributive policies: greater 
income inequality generates increased social pressure and 
social instability, and this creates an adverse environment for 
investment in physical capital. On the other side, greater 
income inequality and greater poverty inhibit access to 
schooling and investment in human capital, thus reducing the 
potential for growth. Both explanations are at odds with a 
deeper scrutiny. The political mechanism hinges on the 
disincentive effect created by fiscal redistribution, which is not 
confirmed by the data.2 The liquidity constraint explanation 
requires that the access to education be prevented by lack of 
financial resources, which is hardly the case in countries where 
public education is nearly cost-free at the compulsory level.3 
However both strands of literature make many simplifying 
                                                 
1 Good surveys of this literature can be found in Benabou (1996a), Bourguignon (1996), 
Aghion, Caroli and Gracia-Peñalosa (1999), and Barro (1999). 
2 See Perotti (1996). 
3 Some empirical evidence in support of these propositions is offered in Bourguignon 
(1994), Checchi (1999) and Filmer and Pritchett (1998). 
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assumptions, the main one of which is that income inequality 
and educational choices are perfectly correlated and that the 
resulting earning distribution replicates educational choices. 
This allows the identification of an intergenerational 
equilibrium in income and education distributions. Since the 
two variables are perfectly correlated, the distribution of 
incomes and the distribution of human capital are shaped by 
the same factors. In many models, the same barriers (the 
absence of financial markets for education financing, the 
cultural poverty of the environment, the inefficiency of the 
public administration in tax levying) prevent investment in 
human capital by a fraction of the population, who 
subsequently earns less income.4 Whenever there is some 
intergenerational persistence (via monetary inheritance or the 
effects of family cultural background), the very same portion of 
the population remains trapped at low levels of education and 
low levels of income for more than one generation. Thus, 
within the logic of formal models, illiterate people and the poor 
are synonymous. But in reality things are far more complicated. 
Educational choices are also correlated with the public 
provision of schools, the prohibition on children labour and the 
generally available opportunities in the labour market.5 
                                                 
4 For example, Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Piketty (1997) 
consider financial market imperfection, while Benabou (1996a) takes into account the role 
of social capital, and Perotti (1993) points to the stage of development and the level of 
available resources. 
5 For example, in rural economies the output gains of child labour are the main obstacle 
to schooling among children. See the Zambian case described by Skyt Nielsen (1999), the 
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Analogously, income distribution can be more closely related to 
employment composition, labour legislation, trade union 
coverage, and fiscal policies than to educational achievements 
among the population.6 
 
However, the distribution of incomes and the distribution of 
educational attainments are obviously related. On one hand, 
income inequality may prevent access to education when 
education is too costly for the family: the more skewed the 
income distribution, the higher the population share excluded 
from schooling and the higher the inequality in educational 
achievements. In this respect, we have a self-perpetuating 
poverty trap that can only be avoided by easing access to 
education.7 On the other hand, improved access to education 
raises the earning opportunity of the lowest strata and, other 
things being constant, reduces earnings inequality. As long as 
total income is proportional to labour income, we can expect a 
positive correlation between the distribution of educational 
achievements and the distribution of incomes in the population. 
But the ‘other things being constant’ assumption is rather 
                                                                                                                                     
Bangladesh case analysed by Ravallion and Wodon (1999) and the Indian case discussed 
by Weiner (1991). 
6 See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Bardone, Gittleman and Keese (1998) for the 
determinants of earnings distribution in OECD economies. Globalization and the effect on 
wage inequality are discussed in Borjas and Ramey (1995), Sachs and Shatz (1996) and 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
7 Checchi (1999) shows that income inequality effectively reduces school enrolment, 
mainly at secondary level. Similar results are in Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim 
(1998). From a formal point of view, this corresponds to the case where current income 
inequality affects the rate of change of inequality in educational achievement. 
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crucial here, since we have to take into account the general 
equilibrium consequences of these changes. Consider for 
example the case of skill-biased technological change. Many 
authors agree that this is one of the potential reasons for the 
boost in the college ‘premium’, at least in the United States. 
With a time lag, this has produced an increase in college 
enrolments despite the rise in tuitions. Until the supply of new 
college graduates depresses the premium, we will observe 
growing income inequality, accompanied by a reduction in 
inequality in educational achievement.8 
 
In the present paper we are concerned with the existing 
correlation between the distribution of educational 
achievements and the distribution of incomes. The literature we 
have mentioned so far does not provide a clear-cut prediction 
on the sign of this relationship. For this reason, in this paper we 
intend to investigate the empirical determinants of aggregate 
income inequality and, more specifically, the relative 
contribution of education to measured income inequality. In 
our opinion, this is crucial for two considerations. First, from a 
theoretical point of view, it is important to understand the 
plausibility of studying intergenerational equilibria under 
stationary distributions of income and human capital in the 
                                                 
8 Freeman (1986) has shown the existence of a similar phenomenon during the 1960s for 
engineers in the US and has provided a ‘cob-web’ model for the dynamics of this 
phenomenon. For more recent evidence, see Murphy, Riddel and Romer (1998). Galor 
and Tsiddon (1996) present a model where the opening of access to education initially 
widens and then reduces the skill premium. 
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population. Second, and far more important, from a policy 
point of view we want to understand whether urging countries 
(or people) to increase their educational achievements is going 
to exacerbate, moderate, or have little influence on the 
subsequent earnings distribution. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on income inequality determinants. The third section 
provides empirical evidence. The fourth section concludes. 
Appendix I indicates data sources and discusses data reliability. 
Appendix II proves some proposition reported in the text. 
 
2. Existing literature 
 
There is a growing literature on the current trends in income 
inequality at world level.9 Rising income inequality occurred 
initially in Anglo-Saxon countries, but now is affecting most 
industrialized nations.10 Among the potential causes of this 
phenomenon, the reduction of the redistributive role of the 
state, the decline in union presence in the workplace, the 
increased competition at international level, technological 
progress and all possible combinations of these are often 
indicated. However, the experiences at national level are very 
                                                 
9 See Atkinson (1999), Cornia (1999) and the references therein. 
10 Milanovic (1999) has computed an increase of 3 Gini points in world income inequality 
from 1988 and 1993, mainly attributable to between-country inequality. 
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diversified, and it is quite hazardous to draw general 
conclusions. Apart from the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis on the 
existence of a non-linear relationship between output per capita 
and income inequality, we do not find much progress in the 
statistical explanation of the observed inequality. In particular, 
little work has been undertaken so far seeking to test alternative 
explanations of the evidence on income distribution and even 
less concerning the relationship between educational 
attainment and income inequality. This is surprising, given the 
fact that compulsory education is publicly and freely provided 
in almost all countries of the world. 
 
At the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on the 
effects of educational attainments on income inequality mainly 
focuses on the two first moments of education distribution, 
namely the average educational attainment (average years of 
schooling) and the dispersion of schooling in the population. 
For the first, Barro (1999) suggests that the relationship between 
income inequality and output growth is negative for poor 
countries and positive for rich countries, the threshold being a 
gross domestic product per capita lower than $2.070 at 1985 
prices.11 He runs conditional convergence regressions on the 
income inequality (from the Deininger and Squire, 1996, 
dataset) measured five years earlier in order to exclude the case 
                                                 
11 Perotti produced some evidence pointing in the same direction as discussant of 
Benabou (1996b). 
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of reverse causation. Then he moves this regressor to the left-
hand side and studies the determinants of income inequality. 
He puts forward some evidence on the existence of an inverted-
U-shaped relationship between output per capita and income 
inequality (with a turning point around $1.636). He controls for 
educational achievement by introducing average educational 
attainments at three levels (primary, secondary and tertiary).12 
But his results are difficult to interpret in this respect, because 
of the contemporaneous presence of different information on 
the distribution of educational achievements (namely, the 
contribution of average human capital and its distribution 
across population subgroups).13 
 
A similar strategy is followed by O’Neil (1995), who 
decomposes output growth over 1967-85 into a ‘quantity’ 
component (as measured by enrolment rates) and a ‘price’ 
component (as measured by relative stocks of human capital). 
His analysis suggests that, while there is convergence among 
countries in the level of educational achievement, the price 
effect works in the opposite direction.14 In the same line of 
                                                 
12 ‘The panel also includes the average years of school attainment for people older than 
15, classified over three educational levels, primary, secondary and higher. The results 
are that primary schooling is negatively and significantly related to inequality, secondary 
school is negatively (but not significantly) related to inequality, and higher education is 
positively and significantly related to inequality’ (Barro, 1999: 26). 
13 To be more precise: an additional average year in either primary school, or in college 
should raise average educational achievement, but the former reduces educational 
variance in the population, while the latter raises it. 
14 ‘The results in table 2 also show that, for both developed countries and Europe, the rise 
in the return to education experienced over the last two decades has caused incomes to 
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research, Deininger and Squire (1998) show that initial 
inequality in assets (land) is relevant in predicting both income 
growth and changes in income inequality.15 Since land 
inequality also reduces average years of education in their 
regressions, they explain this evidence by referring to the 
liquidity constraints on access to education. As a consequence, 
income inequality and educational attainments are positively 
correlated because of the presence of a third conditioning 
variable (wealth inequality). However, while asset (or income) 
inequality may reduce the creation of new human capital (the 
‘flow’ represented by new school-leavers), we see no good 
reason to suppose it might depreciate existing human capital 
(the ‘stock’ represented by the average educational attainment 
of the population).16 In a related paper, Li, Squire and Zou 
(1998) interpret the evidence that the effect of (initial-period) 
average secondary school years on income inequality is 
significant as a proxy for a political effect: the more political 
freedom there is, the more informed is society, the more 
difficult it will be for the rich to appropriate extra resources.17  
                                                                                                                                     
diverge substantially, as those countries that are better endowed with skilled labor reap 
the benefit of the rising premium’ (O’Neil 1995: 1,295). 
15 ‘Low initial inequality is thus doubly beneficial. It is associated with higher aggregate 
growth, the benefits of which accrue disproportionately to the poor’ (Deininger and 
Squire 1998: 261). 
16 In addition, their analysis involves only 52 observations, and liquidity constraints are 
represented mainly not by land distribution, but by the level of current income. 
17 Gradstein and Milanovic (2000) provide additional evidence on the potential existence 
of links between political inclusion and income equality. However, it is not clear which is 
the direction of causation: whether extended franchise supports more redistributive 
policies, or whether less unequal societies strengthen democracy. Justman and Gradstein 
(1999) present similar ideas through a formal model that predicts the existence of an 
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All these papers recognize the existence of a distributional 
aspect in the relationship between income inequality and 
educational inequality, but they rely mainly on average 
attainments. In contrast, the issue of education distribution is 
central in the paper by Lopez, Thomas and Wang (1998).18 They 
demonstrate that human capital, as measured by average 
educational attainment, is statistically non-significant in 
output-growth regressions unless one does not control for the 
distribution human capital (‘who gets what’) or for openness to 
international trade (‘what to do with education’). They explain 
their evidence (on 12 countries over 1970-94) through reference 
to the absence of tradability in human capital that makes price 
equalization impossible and can produce shortages in human 
capital during physical capital accumulation. Along the same 
lines is the argument by Higgins and Williamson (1999), who 
predict the Gini index of income inequality using output per 
worker (linear and quadratic, in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                     
inverted-U-shaped relationship between income inequality and franchise. When the 
median voter income exceeds the average income, regressive redistribution policies are 
adopted, and inequality rises; as long as the median voter income remains below the 
average income, progressive redistributive policies tend to be adopted. Finally, Breen and 
García-Peñalosa (1999) find that greater income inequality is positively associated with 
higher income volatility, as measured by standard deviation in output growth rates, and 
they show that this finding is robust even if one controls for previous variables. They 
suggest that this could be due to the fact that firms offer an implicit contract to risk-averse 
workers. When the environment becomes more uncertain, the cost of this implicit 
insurance rises, and wages are consequently reduced, thus increasing income inequality. 
18 More recently, Castello and Doménech (2001) obtain analogous empirical results 
measuring educational inequality by means of Gini concentration index. Galor and 
Tsiddon (1997) offer another theoretical paper focusing on educational inequality as a 
source of technological progress (and output growth).  
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hypothesis of Kuznets) and cohort-size effects (large mature 
working-age cohorts are associated with lower aggregate 
inequality because of relative excess supply). However, as they 
explicitly recognize, this approach neglects the endogeneity of 
educational choices. Let us suppose that a society is undergoing 
a transitional phase, in which the average educational 
requirement is rising, such that the younger cohorts are better 
educated than the older ones. Other things being constant, the 
smaller the size of the more well educated cohort, the lower the 
recorded inequality in incomes. It is therefore rather possible 
that, through reliance on age-composition variables, the 
authors were actually capturing educational changes.19 At any 
rate, the two measures for educational achievement (average 
educational attainment and some measure of the dispersion of 
attainment) are intertwined. Both Ram (1990) and Londoño 
(1996) claim the existence of an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
between educational achievement and educational inequality, 
and they locate the turning point at 6.8 average years of 
education.20 However, they do not provide a sound theoretical 
                                                 
19 It is true that they control for secondary enrolment rates, but, as we have already 
argued above, this variable measures the flow and not the distribution of the stock of 
human capital. 
20 ‘In a society where there is no education for everyone, the level of education is zero and 
the variance of education among the population is naturally zero. In a society where the 
entire population reaches the maximum level of education, the level of education is at 
maximum, but the variance, again, is zero. . . . In the interim period, the variance of 
education tends to rise with the increase in the level of education until it reaches a turning 
point, after which it decreases’ (Londoño, 1996: 13). However, this reasoning is not 
rigorous on statistical grounds since a generalized increase of education in the population 
produces an increase in average achievement without necessarily raising educational 
inequality. 
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argument to explain this occurrence, nor do they show whether 
this relationship might hold for alternative measures of 
dispersion or concentration.21 
 
What do we learn from this literature? Three points seem 
unquestionable, at least in the empirical literature: 
i) income inequality is clearly related to the stage of 
development in accordance with some sort of Kuznets 
relationship; 
ii) income inequality also reflects the skill level of the 
population, as proxied by average educational attainment.  
iii) it is still unclear whether and how average educational 
attainment and dispersion of schooling jointly contribute to 
shape income distribution.  
 
In addition, in all previous work, we have not found any 
measure related to labour market institutions (such as the 
presence of unions, unemployment benefits, or the minimum 
wage).22 In the sequel, we intend to shed some light on the third 
point by jointly considering average educational achievement 
and dispersion in the population in predicting income 
inequality. We will also take into account some measures of the 
quality/quantity of the resources invested in education. 
                                                 
21  See Appendix II where this issue is extensively discussed. 
22 Nor do we find controls for inequality in explaining employment/unemployment 
rates. See Glyn and Salverda (2000) and Kahn (2000) for an analysis of OECD countries in 
this respect. 
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3. Available measures of inequality 
 
Starting from enrolment rates and making appropriate 
assumptions about mortality rates, Barro and Lee (1996) 
provide estimates of the human capital stock of a country. 
Using mild assumptions on the demographics (similar to the 
permanent inventory method used to estimate the stock of 
physical capital), starting from enrolment rates and possessing 
the distribution of educational achievement at some reference 
time-point, one can obtain estimates of the average years of 
education among the population for each level of education. Let 
us illustrate this with an example. Consider a population in 
which each age cohort grows at a constant rate n  and in which 
the probability of death is constant across ages and equal to δ . 
If we define k  as the life expectancy,23 and denote with jtPop ,  
the population aged j at time t, the entire population is given by  
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Suppose that schooling consists of one year and dropout rates 
are zero (such that enrolment rates coincide with graduation 
rates). Under this assumption, if we indicate with tπ  the 
                                                 
23 It can be determined as ( ) 01: ≈δ− kk . 
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percentage of population born in t  that achieves education, we 
obtain the number of people with education as 
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Therefore, under previous assumptions the current population 
share with education is given by 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1,
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
11
...
...
1
00
00
0
0
0
0,1,,
0,1,1,
<





+
δ−
=ω



ω−
ω−
ωπ=
ω
ω
π=






+
δ−






+
δ−
π
=
=
+δ−
+δ−π
=
+++
π++π+π
==
+
=
−
+−
=
=
−
−
+−
=
−
=
−
+−
=
−
=
−
+−
−
−+−−
∑∑
∑∑
∑
∑
∑
n
n
n
n
n
PopPopPop
PopPopPop
Pop
Pop
HC
k
k
i
ik
ikt
k
i
k
j
jk
ik
iktk
i
ik
k
i
ik
ikt
k
i
iik
k
i
iik
ikt
tktkt
ttktktktkt
t
educated
t
t
 (1) 
 
which is a weighed average of past enrolment rates (with 
declining weights, as in an Almon’s polynomial) . In the 
particular case of constant enrolment rates (i.e. ii ∀π=π , ), 
equation (1) collapses to π=HC .24 Repeated application of 
equation (1) yields 
                                                 
24 With educational cycles lasting more than one year and positive dropout rates, things 
are more complicated, but the logic of the argument holds unchanged. Indicating with tλ  
the age cohort share enrolling a school level lasting n  years (say primary school starting 
at the age of m  and lasting n  years), with a (constant) dropout rate of γ , then the 
enrolment rate would be 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) 1,
1
1
111 <ΩΩπ+ω=
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If we now indicate with ptHC  the population share with some 
primary education and ptP  as the enrolment rate for primary 
education, both measured at time t, it is easy to understand 
why the former variable can be thought as the integral of the 
latter (using the decline rate ω−=µ 1  as a discount factor). In 
symbols 
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where 0pHC  is the (estimated) population share with primary 
education at a given year of reference (usually a census year), 
and µ represents the (constant) decline rate of an age cohort in 
the population. The use of a continuous time representation 
yields: 
 
 ( ) ( )
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t
p
t
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Should the growth rate of the population or the mortality rate 
not remain constant over the years, the above derivations do 
not correspond exactly to the theoretical value implied by 
equation (4). By multiplying pHC  by the number of years 
                                                                                                                                     
which in turn is a weighed average of enrolment at first year, taking into account the 
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required to complete primary education, we obtain the average 
number of years of primary education in the population. When 
we possess this piece of information for each level of education, 
we have an approximation of the distribution of the human 
capital stock in a country. The calculation is just an 
approximation because in many cases an attained educational 
level, say, a secondary degree, may actually be acquired after a 
longer-than-average period of study (because of repetition); in 
addition we could encounter people who attended schools 
without attaining any certificate because earlier dropping-out. 
Even if the information on dropout rates is available, we may 
not know when individuals leave a course of study; therefore, 
we cannot integrate this information in the computation of the 
average stock of human capital.25 Once we have the rough 
distribution of educational achievement in the population, it is 
possible for us to calculate several measures of inequality, 
among which the Gini concentration index of the distribution of 
attained education is one of the easiest to compute. If only 
subgroup averages are known, the general definition of the 
index is modified accordingly: 
 
 hk
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decline due to dropout. 
25 Dropout rates are effectively available in Barro and Lee data set at the primary level. 
This variable ranges from an average (over the period 1960-95) of 3.35% in OECD 
countries to 39.8% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 39.7% in South Asia and 36.6% in Latin 
America. 
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where N is the population size, in is the number of years of 
schooling of individual i, µ is the average years of schooling in 
the population, M is the number of subgroups and hn  is the 
(average) educational attainment in subgroup h. In the case of 
educational attainments, Barro and Lee (1996) provide us with 
the available information on three educational levels.26 This 
allows us to divide the population in four subgroups: higher 
education (a share hHC has attained hn  years of education), 
secondary education (a share sHC  with sn years), primary 
education (a share pHC  with pn  years) and a residual group 
without education ( pshn HCHCHCHC −−−=1 , for which zero 
education is assumed).27 By construction, the average 
population attainment is given by 
 
 hhsspp nHCnHCnHCHC ⋅+⋅+⋅==µ  (6) 
 
and the Gini index on educational attainments is computed as 
follows 
 
                                                 
26 This is another obvious approximation, since we are standardizing educational systems 
into a tripartite classification, corresponding to UNESCO ‘ISCED’ (international standard 
classification system of education levels) standards. However, if a country (like Germany) 
has double-track secondary education (high school and vocational training), each with a 
different duration, the duration will nevertheless be computed as a though it were a 
single figure. 
27 Barro and Lee (1996) make a distinction between ‘attained’ and ‘completed’ 
educational levels. Given the high correlation between the two series, we have preferred 
to adopt the former variable because there are fewer missing observations for it. 
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Starting from the original Barro and Lee (1996) dataset, we have 
extended the observations up to 1995. We therefore have 
information about educational achievements in the population 
for 149 countries at five-year intervals over the period 1960-95. 
Overall, these data cover three-fourths of the 210 countries 
listed by the World Bank (1998), but account for 86.3 per cent of 
the world population (in 1990). However, missing values have 
reduced the potential number of observations from 1,192 to 848 
cases, corresponding to 117 countries (with an average of 7.2 
observations per country). Descriptive statistics on these 
variables appear in table 1 at world aggregate level, in table 2 
with temporal disaggregation and in table 3 with temporal and 
regional disaggregation; additional information about data 
sources is in Appendix 1.  
In the most recent year of observation (1995), we find that one-
third of the world population is illiterate; one-third has primary 
education, and the remaining one-third has secondary 
schooling or more. During the time span under consideration in 
this paper, the average number of years of education rose from 
4.3 to 5.8 at the world level, although this rise was accompanied 
by growing gaps in the same variable computed at regional 
level. The population share composed of illiterate people or 
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people with primary education exhibited a declining trend, 
with some reversal at the end of the period, and there was a 
similar trend in the index of inequality of educational 
achievement. But the global picture varied by region: while 
educational inequality declined in North Africa, South Asia and 
the formerly planned economies, it decreased during the first 
three decades, but rose thereafter in other regions (especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa). Inequality in terms of years of schooling 
remained almost constant at low levels in the OECD countries, 
despite the increase in the average educational attainment. It is 
therefore difficult to trace out a single trend at world level, 
especially because there seems to be a difference among 
countries in the rates of change, as well as in the levels of the 
variables. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Variable 
name 
Mean 
(weight=pop
) 
Median 
(weight=pop
) 
Std.Dev. 
(weight=pop
) 
Obs. 
Population share without education nHC  40.4% 43.1% 0.278 883 
Population share with primary education pHC  33.8% 32.3% 0.172 902 
Population share with secondary 
education 
sHC  19.8% 17.2% 0.143 916 
Population share with higher education hHC  5.6% 2.5% 0.077 919 
Average duration of primary education pn  5.35 5.10 1.153 869 
Average duration of secondary education ps nn − 4.59 4.58 0.824 929 
Average duration of higher education sh nn −  3.49 3.33 0.791 898 
Average years of education µ 4.66 3.89 2.757 848 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
Ginied 49.32 51.74 23.261 848 
Gini index on income inequality Gini 38.01 36.85 8.239 546 
 
Table 2 – Mean values (weight=population) across years 
Variable 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Population share without education 46.3% 46.7% 44.1% 44.6% 43.1% 38.6% 33.5% 35.5% 
Population share with primary education 38.1% 37.1% 37.4% 34.8% 31.2% 32.6% 33.2% 32.3% 
Population share with secondary 
education 
12.5% 12.7% 14.0% 16.2% 20.4% 22.5% 25.3% 22.9% 
Population share with higher education 2.5% 2.8% 3.5% 4.4% 5.4% 6.3% 8.1% 9.0% 
Average duration of primary education 4.91 5.02 5.11 5.05 5.22 5.34 5.40 6.37 
Average duration of secondary education 4.45 4.53 4.65 4.61 4.47 4.52 4.59 4.85 
Average duration of higher education 3.21 3.75 3.45 3.55 3.45 3.40 3.41 3.70 
Average years of education 4.31 3.67 3.93 3.92 4.30 4.81 5.39 5.86 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
44.89 53.63 52.43 53.71 52.07 48.38 44.31 47.03 
Gini index on income inequality 42.05 36.65 37.14 36.47 37.65 37.67 38.43 39.35 
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Table 3 – Mean values (weight=population) across years – 
regional variations 
Variable 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
OECD countries 
Average years of education 6.75 6.98 7.46 7.65 8.59 8.66 9.00 8.81 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
20.68 21.41 21.26 22.64 20.75 20.72 20.98 24.21 
Gini index on income inequality 39.55 37.27 38.01 36.87 35.87 36.20 36.35 37.36 
North Africa and the Middle East 
Average years of education 1.03 1.12 1.36 1.57 2.14 2.77 3.48 4.90 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
85.95 86.03 83.38 83.21 77.70 71.00 64.82 52.71 
Gini index on income inequality 49.05 46.87 49.59 49.29 41.37 47.40 38.72 35.30 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Average years of education 1.01 1.65 1.61 1.66 1.96 2.14 2.32 2.74 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
82.47 74.39 74.83 72.79 67.08 64.33 63.08 75.35 
Gini index on income inequality 51.86 50.76 56.22 44.31 42.47 46.24 52.75 44.98 
South Asia 
Average years of education 0.91 1.37 1.74 2.08 2.45 2.81 3.20 4.23 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
86.23 79.67 77.99 76.14 76.71 72.78 69.08 61.49 
Gini index on income inequality 38.90 37.40 36.74 38.37 38.22 38.64 35.52 30.02 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Average years of education 3.72 3.96 4.34 4.71 5.35 5.82 6.31 6.43 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
50.64 49.02 41.24 39.11 35.33 31.86 31.44 39.27 
Gini index on income inequality 40.19 37.51 36.41 39.65 39.18 39.88 40.02 38.38 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Average years of education 3.06 2.99 3.37 3.47 3.97 4.13 4.74 6.17 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
49.70 50.75 47.68 45.05 44.27 44.23 39.08 43.22 
Gini index on income inequality 52.22 49.93 53.99 53.77 52.31 54.66 54.63 56.05 
formerly Centrally Planned Economies 
Average years of education 3.92 4.83 5.28 3.61 3.68 4.96 6.09 8.17 
Gini index on educational attainment 
inequality 
33.37 35.72 32.20 56.04 52.86 44.69 35.15 23.12 
Gini index on income inequality === 30.52 27.83 26.72 32.06 30.50 33.37 41.53 
 
Since we are interested in the relationship between educational 
achievement and income distribution, we now add the 
dynamics of income inequality to the picture. Here, we rely on 
the dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996) and on the ‘World 
Income Inequality Dataset’ (WIID) collected by WIDER, both of 
which contain a substantial amount of information on 
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inequality measures collected from secondary sources. Among 
these measures, the Gini index on income inequality is the most 
readily available.28 In the present case, we have information on 
546 observations, corresponding to 113 countries (with an 
average of 4.8 observations per country). If we restrict our 
selection to the subset in which there is information about both 
income and education inequality, we have 478 observations for 
97 countries (with an average of 4.9 observations per country; 
Appendix 1 contains a list of the countries). Table 2 reports the 
population-weighted average for this measure computed on all 
available information in the dataset.29 We notice that, despite a 
declining trend in educational inequality (reversed only during 
the 1990s), income inequality at world level started rising after 
1975. Figure 1 (which graphs the data reported in Table 3), 
seems to indicate that this is mainly attributable to the OECD, 
the Latin American countries and the formerly centrally 
planned economies. 
One may wonder whether missing values may distort the 
sample. Looking at Table 4 we may notice that effectively we 
observe an over representation of richest countries and an 
under representation of the poorest countries, both mainly 
attributable to income inequality data. If we run probit 
                                                 
28 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the changes made in the original Deininger and 
Squire dataset, including the 1995 update of the observations. 
29 Given that the Gini index is not decomposable by population subgroup, the trend in 
the population-weighted average has to be viewed with caution. See Milanovic (1999) for 
a more accurate picture based on population surveys (albeit with observations only over 
two years, 1988 and 1993). 
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regression on data availability (as it is done in Table A1 in the 
Appendix) we find that under-representation involves the last 
observation, the less populous and the poorest countries, 
especially in the North-African region. On the contrary, Latin 
American and Asian countries tend to be overepresented.  
 
Table 4 – Available observations for world regions 
World regions potential 
sample 
missing 
income 
missing 
education
effective 
sample 
missing 
income 
missing 
education
effective 
sample 
OECD countries 192 51 17 134 26.6% 8.9% 69.8% 
North Africa and the Middle East 144 110 44 25 76.4% 30.6% 17.4% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 352 256 166 58 72.7% 47.2% 16.5% 
South Asia 56 24 3 31 42.9% 5.4% 55.4% 
East Asia and the Pacific 120 53 39 65 44.2% 32.5% 54.2% 
Latin America and the Caribbean 232 112 48 118 48.3% 20.7% 50.9% 
formerly Centrally Planned 
Economies 96 40 27 47 41.7% 28.1% 49.0% 
Total 1192 646 344 478 54.2% 28.9% 40.1% 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
We now move to the theoretical investigation of correlation 
between the distribution of education and the distribution of 
incomes. So that we can make more precise statements, let us 
now consider what we may expect from theoretical models. If 
we adopt a standard version of the theory of human capital 
investment, initially proposed by Becker (1964) and 
subsequently taken up by Mincer (1974) to estimate the returns 
to education, the (log)incomes and years of education are 
linearly related. In fact, when a Mincer-Becker theory of 
earnings applies, individual earnings would be determined as: 
 
 +⋅β+α= ii ny )log(  
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 + individual characteristics (gender, age, experience, etc) iε+  (8) 
 
where iy  is the earning capacity of individual i, in is the 
educational attainment of individual i (measured in years of 
schooling), β is the (percentage) rate of return to education and 
α is the earning of an individual without formal education; iε  is 
an error term assumed to be i.i.d. (identically independently 
distributed). If we assume that the individual characteristics are 
idiosyncratic in the population and orthogonal with acquired 
education, population subgroups differ only in terms of 
average educational achievement (namely, the within-group 
variance is constant).If we assume that the individual 
characteristics are idiosyncratic in the population and 
orthogonal with acquired education, population subgroups 
differ only with average educational achievements (namely the 
variance within group is constant)30. We therefore expect there 
to be a relationship between the distribution of educational 
achievements and the distribution of actual incomes. However, 
the things are not so simple. Inserting equation (8) into 
equation (7) and ignoring the (average) individual 
characteristics, we obtain the Gini index of log-income 
inequality as: 
 
                                                 
30 Actually, Mincer (1996) shows that between-group variance in earnings distribution in 
the US remained nearly constant during 1970-90, whereas the within-group variance 
expanded after the 1980s. 
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or more synthetically 
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Equation (10) suggests that, at a given average in educational 
achievements, the inequality in education and the inequality in 
(log)earnings are linearly related. If incomes are proportional to 
earnings, this also applies to inequality in (log)incomes. 
However, since the inequality in education is negatively related 
to average education, the actual relationship is non-linear.31 The 
situation is rendered more complicated by the fact that we do 
not possess individual data allowing the calculation of 
inequality measures for (log)incomes. Rather, we are forced to 
rely on aggregate measures based on actual incomes. Once 
more, the relationship between the inequality measures 
obtained from actual values of the variables and the 
corresponding measures computed based on the logarithms is 
                                                 
31 In a previous version of this paper, we made use of simulations (relying on the 
observed values for educational achievement) to analyse the relationship between 
education and income inequality under the assumption that returns to education are 
constant. We found that the relationship is positive and stronger in countries with low-to-
middle inequality in education (lower than 45%), whereas the same relationship is 
negative in countries with very high inequality in education. This is because the Gini 
concentration index is scale invariant (that is, it does not vary when we change the unit of 
measure), but not translation invariant. Therefore, given the presence of a constant (α ≠ 
0), a generalized rise in educational achievement (at the given inequality in educational 
attainments) induces a change in income inequality. 
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not easily ascertained (unless we impose more structure to the 
problem by assuming a specific functional form for the 
frequency distribution). However, it can be formally 
demonstrated that – under mild assumptions about the 
distribution of education in the population and the general 
assumption that the rate of return to education is constant – the 
relationship between the Gini index of actual incomes and the 
average years of education initially rises and then declines.32 
When the assumptions hold, income inequality, education 
inequality and average educational inequality are strictly 
related, as shown in Figure 2, where we have also added a 
fourth variable, the output per capita, in order to control for an 
exogenous driving force. 
 
Starting from the lower right-hand quadrant, we assume that 
an increase in per capita income is associated with an increase 
in the average educational attainment. By construction, this 
yields a consequent decline in educational inequality (lower left 
quadrant).33 If the relationship between average educational 
attainment and income inequality is non-linear, this necessarily 
implies a non-linear relationship between income inequality 
and education inequality (upper left quadrant). By the same 
token, we also obtain an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
between income inequality and per capita income, in the 
                                                 
32 See the Appendix 3. 
33 See, again, the Appendix 3. 
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Kuznets tradition (upper right quadrant). The graph tells us a 
story about the transition from an uneducated population to an 
actual level of schooling. When only the élite attends schools, 
the average level of human capital development among the 
population is low, whereas the inequality in educational 
achievements and in incomes is high. A lowering of the access 
barriers to education leads to an initial increase and then to a 
decline in both inequality measures, and this is accompanied by 
a rise in average educational attainments. A similar story is 
obtained in the model presented by Galor and Tsiddon (1996). 
A first inspection of our dataset indicates that this story may 
have some plausibility. Figure 3 gathers together all the 
available observations, whereby income inequality is measured 
by regression residuals on regional dummies and year-related 
dummies in order to compensate for trends in the variables and 
regional disparities. In addition to a mildly non-linear 
relationship between inequality in actual incomes and 
inequality in education (see the upper left quadrant), a similar 
relationship emerges between the former variable and (the log 
of) GDP per capita, in line with the Kuznets tradition (upper 
right quadrant). Without concerning ourselves too much about 
the direction of the causal relationship, we also find evidence of 
a strict positive correlation between output per capita and 
educational achievement (lower right quadrant). Finally, by 
construction, we find an inversely proportional relationship 
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between inequality in education and average educational 
achievement (lower left quadrant).34 
 
However, the dispersion of single observations suggests that 
many other forces are at work. We should not forget that the 
validity of the story of Figure 2 is conditional on the 
assumption that individual incomes are determined according 
to Becker’s theory of human capital investment and that returns 
to education are constant and are, moreover, identical 
throughout the population and across countries. In reality, we 
know that earnings distribution is shaped by many other 
factors, including technology, unemployment rates, minimum 
wages, age composition, the existence of labour unions, and so 
on.35 Were it certain that these factors remained constant during 
our sample period, we could consider them country-specific 
fixed effects. The problem is that there is no guarantee that they 
remained constant, especially if we take into account the 
                                                 
34 However, the way we measure educational inequality is crucial. Had we chosen the 
standard deviation of educational achievement like Ram (1990), Londoño (1996) and IDB 
(1998), the relationship between average educational attainment and educational 
inequality would have appeared non-linear: 
848,32.0,056.0644.072.1.. 2
2
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==⋅−⋅+= nRHCHCDevSt ed  
In such a case, the turning point would occur at 5.75 years (rather than the 6.8 years 
measured by Ram, 1990). 
35 See Neal and Rosen (1998) for a general presentation of determinants of earnings 
distribution. Higgins and Williamson (1999) find evidence of an effect of age composition 
(as measured by the share of individuals aged 40-59 in the labour force) in determining 
income inequality. With reference to OECD countries, Bardone, Gittleman and Keese 
(1998) show that labour market institutions changed during the sample period: trade 
union density and coverage declined (especially within the Anglo-Saxon world), while 
minimum wages declined almost everywhere, and cuts to welfare assistance may have 
induced lower reservation wages. 
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transformation in public policies induced by the ‘transatlantic 
consensus’ (Atkinson, 1999). 
As a consequence, instead of pretending to predict the shape 
and the evolution of income distribution worldwide, we follow 
in the sequel the less ambitious aim of discovering whether the 
average educational achievement and the distribution of 
educational attainment have played any role in determining 
income inequality. We have already mentioned the fact that 
other authors (Londoño, 1996; Deininger and Squire; 1998; 
Barro, 1999) have shown that average educational achievement 
is one of the determinants of actual income inequality. To this 
result, we now add an examination of the effect on income 
inequality of the distribution of educational achievement in the 
population. 
 
In order to take into account the simultaneous effects of all the 
variables, we resort to multivariate regressions. We take our 
dataset as an unbalanced panel with a potential dimension of 
752 observations (94 countries times 8 observations per 
country), which we reduce to 454 observations because of 
missing data on one or the other variable. Table 5 shows 
estimates of actual income inequality using fixed effects, 
whereas Table A2 in Appendix 2 relies on random effect 
estimators. In both tables we start with two alternative 
specifications of the relationship between income inequality 
and output per capita, without taking into account educational 
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factors (first and second columns). Both specifications reject the 
hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between income 
inequality and per capita output.36 The two measures are 
negatively correlated, with a rather low elasticity (-0.049 at 
sample means). This implies that, in order for the Gini index of 
income inequality to be reduced by 1 point, income per capita 
has to rise by $2,311 (at 1985 international prices). If we replace 
per capita income by educational variables (third and fourth 
columns), we notice an increase in explanatory power only if 
we consider average educational achievement. This is not 
surprising given the high correlation of the latter measure with 
per capita income. Both average educational achievement and 
educational inequality are significant, but the relationship 
between the two measures of inequality is opposed to the 
theoretical expectation (being U shaped and not inverted-U 
shaped). We consider GDP per capita and educational variables 
together in the fifth column. Here, we find that output per 
capita has a low negative impact, as does average human 
capital, though with a higher effect: an average increase of one 
year of education in the population lowers the Gini index of 
income inequality by more than 1 point. The sixth column 
offers an alternative (hyperbolic) specification of the functional 
relationship relating income inequality and average human 
capital: given the non-linear relationship existing between the 
Gini index of educational inequality, the variable ch/1  seems 
                                                 
36 On a different data set Anand and Kanbur 1993 obtained statistically significant results. 
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able to capture all the explanatory power contained in the 
educational distribution variable.37 
 
However, the explanatory contribution of the distribution of 
educational achievement is region specific and rather unstable. 
If we run fixed effect estimates for world regions (as in Table 6), 
we see that education distribution variables are significant for 
OECD countries, Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries, 
that is the countries at the extremes of income and/or 
education inequality.38 When we include repeated cross-
sectional estimates (as in Table 7), we find that the average 
educational achievement and the Gini index of educational 
inequality (in level and squared level) are statistically 
significant in five of eight cases, but now the non-linear 
relationship is of the inverted-U-shaped type (which is in line 
with human capital investment theory). One potential reason 
for this instability is that omitted variables might contribute to 
a reversion in the trend in income inequality. In Figure 4 we 
have graphed the coefficients of yearly dummies obtained in 
                                                 
37 However, this result is not robust. When we introduce a proxy for technological 
progress (the capital/output ratio) in the regressions (see Table A2 in Appendix 2), the 
inequality in educational attainment retains its sign and significance even with the 
hyperbolic functional form. Notice that the number of observations is reduced under this 
specification because we do not have information about national capital stocks for 18 of 
the countries. 
38 Regional dummies (used in the estimates of random effects reported in Table A2) 
indicate that the greatest inequality was registered in Latin America and sub-Saharan 
Africa, where inequality indexes were 6 percentage points higher than they were in the 
OECD countries (which represent the reference case; see the fifth column in Table A2). 
Conversely, the distribution was more egalitarian in the currently (or previously) 
centrally planned economies, where the Gini index was 12 percentage points lower than it 
was in the OECD, and in South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. 
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the regressions reported in the fifth columns of Tables 5 and 
A2. These coefficients (normalized by the coefficient of the 
initial year) measure a shift in the intercepts of the regressions, 
thus capturing part of the variance that is left unexplained by 
the estimated model and that is year specific. For the first half 
of the sample (until 1975), we witness a growing pressure for 
the compression of income distribution (on the order of 1 point 
in the Gini index every five years), whereas this effect 
disappears during the 1980s. In the 1990s the phenomenon 
works in the opposite direction, favouring widening income 
disparity. 
Since by definition yearly/regional dummies capture 
unexplained components, we do not have reliable explanations 
for these effects that do not refer to per capita income or 
educational achievement. Nevertheless, we have experimented 
with two additional variables that may capture some of the 
differences among countries or years. The first one is the 
physical capital/output ratio. On theoretical grounds, if 
physical and human capital are substitutes in the aggregate 
production function, an increase in the former raises the 
productivity of the latter. Therefore, cœteris paribus, we will 
obtain higher returns to education whenever physical capital 
accumulation becomes more intensive. Thus, we can expect 
greater income inequality whenever and wherever there is 
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intensive investment in physical capital.39 This variable is 
introduced in Table 7 and also in Table A3 in Appendix 2 
(which reproduces information in Table 5, though the number 
of observations is reduced because of missing information). 
This variable is not very significant in the fixed effect estimates, 
but has a positive and significant sign in the repeated cross-
sectional estimates (up to 1985). Other things being constant, 
countries characterized by higher accumulation in physical 
capital also exhibit higher income inequality: passing from an 
average yk /  ratio of 2 in South Asia to 3 in the OECD countries 
raises the Gini index of income inequality by 2 (up to 5) points. 
However it is insignificant in more recent years. 
 
The second variable we take into account is the amount of 
public resources invested in education. If the technology for 
human capital formation includes invested resources, we can 
expect increased human capital per unit of time spent in school 
whenever education expenditure is raised. The resources 
invested in education should include both public and private 
expenditure for the management of educational institutions. In 
the absence of reliable information about private expenditure, 
we can use the ratio of government educational expenditure to 
gross domestic product. An undesirable feature of introducing 
new controls is the increase in the number of missing 
                                                 
39 This claim is objectionable when we think of information and telecommunications 
technologies, for which the capital/output ratio is actually lower than it is for 
manufacturing, notwithstanding the fact that the earnings differentials are higher. 
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observations. In the first column of Table A4 in Appendix 2, we 
have reproduced the fifth column of Table 5 to facilitate 
comparison. Using the same specification, we restrict the 
number of cases to applicable observations for the 
capital/output ratio (second column), and then we introduce 
the capital/output ratio (third column). We observe that an 
increase in capital accumulation raises income inequality 
(though with an elasticity which is quite low); all the other 
variables preserve their signs and significance. We now 
proceed to consider the ratio of (current+capital) government 
expenditure on education to gross domestic product (variable 
edgvsh ).40 The fourth column reduces the sample to country/year 
observations corresponding to non-missing values for the edgvsh  
variable, whereas the fifth column introduces the edgvsh  variable; 
the yk /  variable is dropped in the sixth column, which makes 
full use of the available sample. Even in this case, we observe 
that countries characterized by higher public expenditure on 
education exhibit higher income inequality. It is obvious that 
countries with higher educational achievements spend more on 
education. However, given the fact that we are controlling for 
average educational achievement (variable ch ) and the 
distribution of educational achievement (variable educGini ), the 
additional effect could be taken as evidence that the ‘quality’ of 
human capital incorporated in the same number of years of 
                                                 
40 This variable is taken from UNESCO (1998). It is missing for 1960 and 1965, and there 
is a sample mean of 4.25% (standard deviation: 1.86). 
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schooling is higher, thus generating more dispersion in 
earnings. In this specification, however, the capital/output 
ratio loses significance.41 
 
 
                                                 
41 A third aspect that we would have liked to consider is the possibility of different 
returns for different educational levels, which is invoked by Gottschalk and Smeeding 
(1997) as one potential explanation for rising earnings inequality in the US. We know 
from the literature (Psacharopoulos, 1994) that returns to education differ from country to 
country and tend to decline with a rising level of development. But we do not have time-
series proxies for this differential effect, and we are forced to leave this effect out. 
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Table 5 – Estimates of income inequality – 1960-1995 –  
94 countries – fixed effects 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# countries: 94 94 94 94 94 94
# obs : 454 454 454 454 454 454
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 46.953 47.401 49.283 59.164 57.491 48.163
(29.91) (31.75) (15.76) (12.17) (11.67) (15.26)
gdp -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.77) (-2.39) (-1.86) (-2.64)
gdp² -0.000
(-0.16)
1/gdp -423.050
(-0.23)
ginied -0.182 -0.310 -0.279 -0.069
(-1.45) (-2.31) (-2.08) (-0.53)
ginied² 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000
(1.48) (1.95) (2.03) (0.32)
hc -1.470 -1.134
(-2.64) (-1.94)
1/hc 2.364
(2.84)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(within) 0.066 0.066 0.056 0.075 0.084 0.095
===============================================================================
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Table 6 – Estimates of income inequality by world regions –  
1960-1995 – fixed effects 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model : OECD NthAfric SaharAfr SthAsia EastAsia LtAmerica PlnEcon World
# countr: 21 8 21 5 10 22 7 94
# obs : 133 25 57 31 65 117 26 454
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini gini gini
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 65.654 -60.263 6.306 59.959 45.058 39.637 79.638 57.491
(8.44) (-0.50) (0.16) (1.05) (3.59) (2.59) (1.83) (11.67)
gdp 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
(0.39) (-0.61) (0.70) (-0.24) (-0.47) (-0.26) (1.75) (-1.86)
ginied -0.941 1.638 1.392 -0.716 0.269 0.810 -1.370 -0.279
(-3.22) (0.69) (1.46) (-0.67) (0.83) (1.41) (-1.16) (-2.08)
ginied² 0.011 -0.005 -0.010 0.006 -0.004 -0.008 0.010 0.002
(2.16) (-0.36) (-1.28) (0.91) (-1.43) (-1.25) (0.84) (2.03)
hc -1.787 4.647 -1.717 0.734 -0.894 -2.272 -4.744 -1.134
(-1.95) (0.58) (-0.31) (0.14) (-0.77) (-1.66) (-1.24) (-1.94)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(within) 0.332 0.735 0.387 0.436 0.238 0.142 0.711 0.084
==============================================================================================
 
Table 7 – Estimates of income inequality –  
yearly cross sections – robust estimates 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year: 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
#countries: 40 47 60 53 55 57 65 24
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini gini gini
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 46.943 40.760 32.317 52.368 37.297 37.560 49.381 19.402
(4.49) (3.73) (2.91) (6.26) (3.24) (3.53) (2.94) (0.64)
k/y 2.294 3.595 4.943 2.358 3.926 2.507 0.795 -1.497
(2.28) (2.56) (4.94) (4.22) (3.48) (2.30) (0.83) (-0.61)
gdp 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.05) (0.28) (1.22) (-0.56) (-1.98) (-2.08) (-1.82) (-1.97)
ginied 0.118 0.194 0.574 -0.012 0.291 0.294 0.375 1.150
(0.56) (0.60) (1.92) (-0.05) (1.08) (1.15) (0.94) (2.34)
ginied² -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.013
(-0.94) (-0.76) (-2.26) (-0.50) (-1.72) (-1.39) (-1.49) (-2.44)
hc -1.457 -1.980 -2.967 -2.493 -1.052 -0.719 -1.532 2.275
(-0.98) (-1.47) (-3.02) (-3.09) (-1.20) (-0.80) (-1.28) (0.67)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R² 0.263 0.23 0.568 0.498 0.538 0.45 0.38 0.446
==================================================================================================
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Summing up, we have found that per capita income and 
average years of education in the population negatively affect 
income inequality. Some additional explanatory contribution is 
provided by the distribution of educational attainments in the 
population, and this variable exhibits a non-linear relationship 
with income inequality. Higher investment in physical capital 
(as proxied by capital/output ratio) or in human capital 
formation (as proxied by the ratio of educational expenditure to 
gross output) contributes to higher income inequality. These 
results are robust to alternative specifications, and we therefore 
go back to our initial (and preferred) specification, which is 
provided in the fifth column of Table 5 and reproduced here for 
simplicity (yearly dummies not shown): 
 
 HCGiniGinigdpGini educeduc ⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅−=
)94.1(
2
)03.2()08.2()86.1()6.11(
13.1002.0279.0004.049.57income  (11) 
 
If we take into account that, on the same sample, fixed effect 
regression yields (again, yearly dummies are not shown here): 
 
 HCGini ⋅−=
)84.22()3.43(
77.637.71educ  (12) 
 
and we replace equation (12) into equation (11), we get 
 
 2091.018.1004.072.37 HCHCgdpGini ⋅+⋅−⋅−=income  (13) 
 
Equation (13) tells us that, for a given level of per capita income, 
income inequality has a U-shaped relationship with the average 
years of education in the population, with a turning point 
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around 6.48 years. For all countries below this threshold, the 
two variables are negatively correlated, while the two become 
positively correlated above this threshold. Using the regional 
averages reported in Table 3, we can say that additional 
education promotes inequality in the OECD countries (and 
very recently also in the formerly planned economies), whereas 
it is beneficial with respect to inequality in the other regions of 
the world.  
A final perspective on the relevance of educational achievement 
in predicting income inequality can be obtained by 
manipulating equation (10), which can be rearranged as: 
 
 
edG
G
HC
incomelog−
−=β+α
α 1  (14) 
 
Equation (14) tells us that 1 minus the ratio between the 
inequality in (log)incomes and the inequality in education can 
provide a rough estimate of the ratio between the income of an 
uneducated person and the income of a person with average 
education. The problem is that we do not have information on 
either individual earnings (or incomes), and we therefore 
cannot compute the Gini index of logarithms of these variables, 
as required in equation (14). However, using simulations based 
on the observed distribution of educational achievement in the 
sample, we have computed the Gini index on both incomes and 
log-incomes. The two measures are proportionally related, with 
the goodness of the fit declining with the rate of return, β, 
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assumed in the simulation.42 Using this result, we have 
computed an (estimated) Gini index of log-income that allows 
us to obtain the measure proposed in equation (14). This is 
depicted in Figure 5. From the dynamics of this indicator at 
regional level, we notice that the educational premium is higher 
in the OECD countries (mainly because they have a higher 
average educational achievement), followed by Asia and Latin 
America. In all cases but one, this premium has been declining 
in recent years. In contrast, the return to education seems to be 
rising in the formerly planned economies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
Our plan in this paper has been to measure the inequality in 
educational achievement by constructing a Gini index of 
educational attainment. We have then used the proposed 
measure to analyse the relationship between inequality in 
incomes and inequality in educational achievement (in terms of 
both the average attainments and the concentration of 
educational achievement). Though theoretical considerations 
based on the theory of human capital investment suggest that 
                                                 
42 For example, the estimated equation, assuming 100=α  and 1.0=β , is 
 848,95.0)(,009.0005.0 2
)8.123()96.2(
==⋅+−=
−
obswithinRGiniGini incomeincomelog  
Based on an average among several simulations obtained by varying α, or β, or both, we 
have computed a measure of the Gini index of log(income). However, since the right-
hand variable includes total incomes (and not merely earnings, as the pure theory of 
human capital would require), the estimated measure of log-incomes is only an 
approximation of what we would have liked to measure to evaluate the ratio 
uneducated/educated. 
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we should expect a non-linear relationship between these two 
measures of inequality, we have seen that the actual data 
indicate that average years of education have a stronger 
negative impact on measured income inequality. Multivariate 
regressions also demonstrate that, if we take into account the 
negative correlation between average educational achievement 
and the dispersion of educational achievement, the relationship 
between income inequality and average years of schooling is U-
shaped, with a lower turning point at 6.5 years. Obviously, 
income inequality is also negatively related to per capita 
income; other things being constant, countries characterized by 
higher accumulation or greater government expenditure on 
education experience higher income inequality. 
 
But most of these results are region specific. Even if the world 
has experienced what can called an ‘educational cycle’ during 
the post-war period (an increase in the average schooling by 2.2 
years and a reduction in the Gini index of educational 
inequality by about 9), the consequences on income inequality 
were not univocal. Looking at the relationship between 
education and income inequality at regional level (as in Figure 
6, that depicts the weighted mean values for each time-unit of 
observation), we notice that at least three separate patterns can 
be identified in the ‘educational cycle’ at world level. North 
Africa and South Asia exhibit the first pattern. Most of the 
countries in these regions started from a quite low initial base 
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of educational attainment (around one year of average 
schooling in North Africa and South Asia in the 1960s), but 
were quite effective in improving the situation, more than 
quadrupling this average. These are not the only regions in 
which we find that education has the effect of reducing 
inequality. 
A second pattern is represented by East Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa, which initially followed the first pattern, though at a 
slower speed (the average years of schooling increased from 3.7 
to 6.4 and from 1.0 to 2.7, respectively, during 1960-95). The 
‘leap forward’ in educational attainment in these countries 
seems to have been insufficient to modify basic social structures 
(in contrast to the successful countries in the first group). 
Inequality in education initially declined, but after the 1970s 
there was a trend reversal, and this was accompanied by an 
increase in income inequality. 
Finally, the third group is formed by the Latin American 
countries and the (formerly or currently) centrally planned 
economies. Both sets of countries were characterized by high 
initial levels of education (3.1 and 3.9 years on average, 
respectively, in 1960); nonetheless, they were able to raise the 
average significantly (to 6.2 and 8.2 years, respectively, by 
1995). Educational inequality declined, but income inequality 
rose substantially, as indicated by the Gini index: 6 additional 
points in Latin America and more than 10 points in the planned 
economies. 
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The OECD countries represent a story on their own. The only 
group with average educational attainments above the 
threshold of 6.5 years, these countries experienced a widening 
in educational differentials during the entire sample period that 
was accompanied, after 1975, by rising income inequality. 
 
A general lesson emerges from this evidence: increased access 
to education reduces income inequality only if two conditions 
are met. First, the initial level of educational attainment must be 
sufficiently low; second, the average educational attainment 
must be raised sufficiently rapidly. A potential explanation of 
these results is offered by the interaction between the supply 
and the demand of human capital, that is, the educational 
choices of the population and job creation by firms.43 When the 
average educational level in the population is low, there are 
very few highly educated people who are likely to obtain high 
salaries. At the same time, there are no incentives for the 
creation of new jobs for skilled workers since firms are 
constrained by factor supply. However, when more and more 
educated people begin entering the labour market, the speed of 
technological innovation increases, followed by the creation of 
more skilled jobs. More people earn higher wages, and as a 
consequence income inequality starts declining. When the bulk 
of the labour force has at least a primary level of education, 
                                                 
43 On the relationship between the availability of skills and job creation, see Agemoglu 
(1995, 1996). 
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leaps in technology (such as in information technology and 
telecommunications) are possible because skilled workers can 
now accomplish the more sophisticated tasks. The rise in the 
productivity of these workers is reflected in their remuneration, 
thus inducing a trend reversal in income inequality. In this 
way, we replicate the non-linear relationship between average 
educational attainment and income inequality, which is also 
conditioned by the level of technical development. 
 
One may object that causality can work in the opposite 
direction: lower income inequality facilitates access to 
education and therefore contributes to a reduction in the 
inequality in education. However, this may be true only in the 
steady state. Thus, Checchi (1999) has shown that income 
inequality reduces enrolment rates, mainly at the secondary 
level. But enrolment rates reflect the rate of change of the 
existing human capital stock and therefore affect the rate of 
change in educational inequality. Yet, enrolment rates cannot 
affect the rate of change and the level of the same variable at 
the same time. In our framework, current income inequality 
affects future educational inequality, which, according to 
human capital theory, will shape future income inequality. 
Therefore, reverse causation may apply only along the 
intertemporal dimension.44 
                                                 
44 In order to control for potential endogeneity, we have also considered the possibility of 
lagging the educational variables (see table A5 in Appendix 2), but despite of the 
reduction in the sample these variables retain their significance. 
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Appendix 1 – Data source 
 
We have taken seriously the recommendation of Atkinson and 
Brandolini (1999). Data on income inequality are mainly from 
Deininger and Squire (1996)45. In addition, 12 observations 
(average = 35.05) referred to OECD countries are from 
Brandolini (1998) and 25 (average = 43.54) are from World Bank 
(1998). Finally 7 observations (average = 37.65) are from WIID 
(World Income Inequality Dataset, downloadable at 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. On the whole we 
have 546 observations referred to 113 countries (with an 
average of 4.8 observations per country)46.  
 
While there are no significant differences in Gini indexes when 
the recipient unit is the (equivalised) household or the 
individual, we find an average difference of 6.47 percentage 
points when the same measure is based on gross incomes 
instead of net ones.47 We could have introduced a dummy 
variable controlling for the income definition (as in Deininger 
and Squire 1998), but in such a case we would have dispensed 
with all observations for which this information was absent. 
For this reason, we have preferred to augment the measures 
based on net incomes by the average difference.48  
 
                                                 
45 Downloaded on 22 October 1998. Among these, 349 observations are labelled ‘high 
quality’ (average = 38.79), and 153 observations are labelled ‘low quality’ (average = 
45.87). 
46 The number of observations reduces to 471 (corresponding to 97 countries with an 
average of 4.9 observations per country) when we restrict to the cases with non-missing 
observations on educational variables. 
47 By regressing Gini index on income distribution on a dummy variable INCOME (which 
is equal to 1 when the recipient unit is the equivalised household, and 0 when is the 
individual) we get 
471,00.0,01.178.41 2
)03.1()9.58(
==⋅−= nRINCOMEGini  
On the contrary, creating a dummy variable TYPE (equal to 1 when inequality measure is 
based on gross incomes, and 0 when is based on net income) we get 
369,10.0,46.694.35 2
)46.6()9.35(
==⋅+= nRTYPEGini . 
48 Similar correction was applied to Gini measures based on rural samples (5 
observations), which on average resulted higher than national coverage samples by 8.94 
points. 
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Data on physical capital stocks are from Nehru and 
Dhareshwar (1993). Data on per-capita income and educational 
achievements are from Barro and Lee (1993, 1994, 1996, and 
1997).49 In particular, data on estimated length of schooling 
hspini ,,, = , have been obtained by dividing the average years of 
schooling for a given level of education by the population share 
who completed that level of education: using Barro and Lee 
(1996) definitions:50 
 
high25
hyr25
high25sec25
syr25
high25sec25pri25
pyr25
=
+
=
++
= hsp nnn ,, . 
 
Where possible, the series have been updated to 1995 using 
World Bank (1998) and UNESCO (1998). Data on average years 
of schooling for 1995 have been estimated based on the 
corresponding enrolment rates for the previous three decades. 
 
The list of 97 countries for which we have non-missing 
observations on inequality in incomes and inequality in 
educational achievements is as follows (the number of available 
observations is given in brackets): 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Botswana (3), Cameroon (1), Central African Republic (1), Gambia (1), Ghana (3), Guinea-Bissau (1), 
Kenya (7), Lesotho (1), Liberia (1), Malawi (4), Mauritius (3), Niger (1), Rwanda (1), Senegal (3), Sierra 
Leone (3), South Africa (6), Sudan (2), Tanzania (6), Uganda (3), Zambia (4), Zimbabwe (2). 
North Africa and Middle East: 
Algeria (2), Egypt (3), Tunisia (7), Iran (3), Israel (5), Jordan (3), North Yemen (1), Cyprus (1). 
East Asia and the Pacific: 
Hong Kong (7), Indonesia (7), Japan (7), Korea (7), Malaysia (7), Philippines (7), Singapore (6), Taiwan 
(7), Thailand (7), Fiji (3). 
South Asia: 
Bangladesh (7), India (7), Nepal (3), Pakistan (7), Sri Lanka (7). 
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Barbados (4), Reunion (1), Costa Rica (8), Dominica (4), El Salvador (6), Guatemala (4), Honduras (4), 
Jamaica (7), Mexico (8), Nicaragua (1), Panama (6), Trinidad and Tobago (5), Argentina (6), Bolivia (3), 
Brazil (7), Chile (7), Colombia (8), Ecuador (4), Guyana (2), Paraguay (3), Peru (6), Uruguay (7), 
Venezuela (7). 
                                                 
49 Barro and Lee (1994) is in turn based on Summers and Heston (1991). 
50 This procedure yields unreasonable values of pn  for few observations. In these cases, 
these values have been replaced either with the corresponding values computed on the 
population with more than 15 years or with the legal duration of primary education (as 
measured in 1965 – variable durp in the original Barro-Lee data set). 
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OECD countries: 
Australia (8), Austria (4), Belgium (6), Canada (8), Denmark (6), Finland (8), France (8), (West) Germany 
(8), Greece (6), Ireland (5), Italy (6), Netherlands (7), New Zealand (7), Norway (7), Portugal (3), Spain 
(6), Sweden (7), Switzerland (2), Turkey (6), United Kingdom (8), United States (8). 
Centrally planned economies: 
China (4), Cuba (3), Czechoslovakia (7), Hungary (7), Yugoslavia (6), Bulgaria (7), Romania (1), (former) 
Soviet Union (5). 
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Appendix 2 – Additional tables  
Table A1 – Probit estimates of data availability – 1960-1995 – 139 countries  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-------------------------------------------
# obs : 992 992 992
Depvar: income education inc&educ
-------------------------------------------
intcpt -7.961 -3.966 -8.302
(-8.84) (-4.09) (-8.88)
year=65 -0.153 0.065 0.101
(-0.81) (0.32) (0.51)
year=70 0.233 0.078 0.428
(1.23) (0.38) (2.15)
year=75 -0.120 0.279 0.162
(-0.62) (1.31) (0.81)
year=80 -0.174 0.269 0.016
(-0.90) (1.24) (0.08)
year=85 -0.233 0.133 0.053
(-1.23) (0.65) (0.27)
year=90 0.090 0.056 0.303
(0.48) (0.27) (1.54)
year=95 -1.196 -0.444 -1.414
(-4.73) (-1.69) (-5.19)
northafric -0.772 -0.402 -0.961
middleast (-3.83) (-1.69) (-4.57)
subsaharan 0.025 -0.468 -0.250
africa (0.10) (-1.64) (-0.99)
southasia 0.160 0.742 0.283
(0.53) (1.54) (0.92)
eastasia 0.420 0.061 0.521
pacific (1.87) (0.22) (2.27)
latin 0.505 0.644 0.577
america (2.63) (2.48) (2.93)
centr.pl. 0.726 -1.327 -0.194
economies (2.11) (-4.26) (-0.65)
log(pop) 0.439 0.272 0.413
(12.01) (7.38) (11.18)
log(gdp) 0.537 0.357 0.576
(6.27) (3.80) (6.46)
growth 3.371 -4.574 3.178
populat (1.77) (-2.49) (1.47)
-------------------------------------------
R² 0.287 0.253 0.341
===========================================
Table A2– Estimates of income inequality – 1960-1995  
– 94 countries – random effects  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# countries: 94 94 94 94 94 94
# obs : 454 454 454 454 454 454
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 46.389 45.999 38.889 53.066 53.149 43.112
(18.96) (21.75) (18.11) (12.16) (12.21) (15.83)
gdp -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-1.84) (-3.65) (-2.13) (-3.57)
gdp² 0.000
(0.43)
1/gdp -425.957
(-0.30)
ginied 0.102 -0.108 -0.096 0.135
(1.07) (-0.99) (-0.88) (1.35)
ginied² -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(-0.56) (0.46) (0.57) (-1.39)
hc -1.557 -1.136
(-3.71) (-2.46)
1/hc 2.464
(3.19)
northafric -2.161 -1.850 0.160 -1.118 -3.162 -2.840
middleast (-0.73) (-0.64) (0.05) (-0.38) (-1.03) (-0.92)
subsaharan 7.381 8.222 11.021 7.864 5.541 6.154
africa (2.69) (2.94) (4.53) (3.08) (1.99) (2.23)
southasia -5.373 -4.606 -1.991 -4.236 -6.749 -7.090
(-1.52) (-1.32) (-0.60) (-1.28) (-1.91) (-2.01)
eastasia -0.588 -0.287 1.953 1.130 -0.580 -1.298
pacific (-0.23) (-0.11) (0.83) (0.48) (-0.23) (-0.52)
latin 7.135 7.411 10.291 8.069 6.338 6.340
america (3.19) (3.41) (5.26) (3.98) (2.89) (2.91)
centr.pl. -13.562 -13.367 -9.255 -9.537 -12.206 -13.339
economies (-4.52) (-4.50) (-3.46) (-3.61) (-4.16) (-4.62)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(overall) 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.54
===============================================================================
Excluded case: OECD/1960
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Table A3 – Estimates of income inequality – 1960-1995 –  
fixed effects - using capital/output ratio 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# countries: 76 76 76 76 76 76
# obs : 401 401 401 401 401 401
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 47.109 48.409 51.909 67.357 65.054 54.084
(22.21) (23.21) (13.75) (12.76) (12.20) (13.25)
k/y 0.860 0.931 0.317 0.714 0.791 0.546
(1.18) (1.30) (0.44) (1.00) (1.12) (0.76)
gdp -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.56) (-2.93) (-2.36) (-3.11)
gdp² 0.000
(0.46)
1/gdp -3515.234
(-1.82)
ginied -0.332 -0.556 -0.515 -0.404
(-2.39) (-3.81) (-3.53) (-2.62)
ginied² 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005
(2.37) (3.29) (3.44) (2.84)
hc -2.470 -2.059
(-4.09) (-3.29)
1/hc -3.641
(-1.07)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(within) 0.089 0.098 0.079 0.125 0.141 0.114
===============================================================================
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Table A4 – Estimates of income inequality – 1960-1995 –  
fixed effects – using educational expenditure 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# countries: 94 76 76 69 69 75
# obs : 454 401 401 241 241 256
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini gini
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 57.491 66.599 65.054 65.538 66.066 68.070
(11.67) (12.93) (12.20) (6.69) (6.82) (7.20)
gdp 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.86) (-2.31) (-2.36) (-3.25) (-3.47) (-2.95)
ginied -0.279 -0.529 -0.515 -0.614 -0.718 -0.648
(-2.08) (-3.64) (-3.53) (-3.07) (-3.53) (-3.10)
ginied² 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.007
(2.03) (3.59) (3.44) (4.21) (4.67) (3.95)
hc -1.134 -1.977 -2.059 -1.419 -1.523 -1.921
(-1.94) (-3.18) (-3.29) (-1.70) (-1.85) (-2.43)
k/y 0.791 0.570 0.030
(1.12) (0.60) (0.03)
edgvsh 0.979 0.902
(2.22) (2.04)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(within) 0.084 0.137 0.141 0.194 0.218 0.169
===============================================================================
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Table A5 – Estimates of income inequality – 1960-1995  
– fixed effects – lagged educational variables 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
#countries: 94 94 94 94 94
# obs : 432 432 432 432 432
Depvar: gini gini gini gini gini
-------------------------------------------------------------------
intcpt 48.360 49.631 50.589 58.623 57.049
(40.23) (15.45) (16.16) (11.07) (10.15)
gdp 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(-2.04) (-2.15) (-2.28) (-1.43) (-1.75)
ginied -0.098 -0.224
(-0.76) (-1.58)
ginied² 0.001 0.002
(1.03) (1.43)
ginied
-1 -0.137 -0.220
(-1.17) (-1.67)
ginied²
-1 0.002 0.002
(1.48) (1.78)
hc -1.328
(-2.13)
hc,-1 -0.654
(-1.38)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
--- --- --- --- ---
-------------------------------------------------------------------
R²(within) 0.077 0.081 0.084 0.093 0.089
===================================================================
 60
Appendix 3 – Alternative education inequality measures  
 
 
Let us consider two groups in the population: one group has 0 years of 
education and has dimension ( )HC−1 ;  the second group has n years of 
education and has dimension equal to HC . Given the fact that the average 
educational attainment is HCn ⋅ , when we can compute the standard 
deviation of educational attainment obtaining  
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )22201.. HCHCnHCnnHCHCnHCDevSt −⋅=⋅−+⋅−−=  (A.1) 
 
which by construction exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
average educational achievement and its standard deviation.51 
Educational inequality (as measured by standard deviation) will rise until 
the population with n years of education will have reached 0.5, and then 
will start declining. In fact  
 
 ( )
2
1021
2
..
2
<>⋅−⋅
−
= HCiffHC
HCHC
n
dHC
DevdSt  (A.2) 
 
If we adopt a different measure for educational inequality (like the Gini 
concentration index on educational attainment) for an analogous case, we 
get 
 
 
( )[ ] ( )HC
HCn
HCHCn
Ginied −=
⋅⋅
−⋅⋅−⋅
= 1
2
102
 (A.3) 
 
which is obviously linear in educational attainment. When no one has 
education, edGini is obviously zero. When the first person goes to school, 
edGini  jumps to 1 and then declines steadily as more and more people go 
to school. 
 
Moving to income distribution, let us assume that income is solely 
determined by educational achievement (i.e. ( ) ii ny ⋅β+α=lg ). Therefore a 
group ( )HC−1  of the population will earn ( )[ ]αexp , and the other 
complementary group will earn ( )[ ]n⋅β+αexp . The Gini indexes on 
incomes (or log-incomes) distribution are rather similar 
 
                                                 
51 Therefore, the results obtained by Ram (1990) and Londoño (1996), where they show an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between average educational attainment and education 
inequality (as measured by the standard deviation) are almost implied by the inequality 
measure that has been chosen. 
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It can be proved that there is a non-linear relationship between HC and 
either ( )yGinilg  or yGini . Computing the first derivative of yGini  with 
respect to HC yields  
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Therefore inequality in incomes, as measured by Gini index, will initially 
increase and afterwards decreases when a growing share of the 
population gains access to school. 
 
One may object that this could depend on the assumption of just two 
groups in the population. It can be proved that this is not the case, since 
the same qualitative results obtain at least with three groups of 
population. Let us consider the case where one group has 0 years of 
education and has dimension ( )spn HCHCHC −−= 1 ;  a second group of 
size pHC  has pn years of schooling; and a third group has sn  years of 
schooling and size equal to sHC . The mean educational attainment is 
sspp HCnHCnHC += . The standard deviation has to be redefined as 
 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) spspsssppp
ssppsp
HCHCnnHCHCnHCHCn
HCnHCHCnHCHCHCHCDevSt
211
01..
22
222
−−⋅+−⋅=
=−+−+−−−=
(A.7) 
 
In order to study the evolution of education inequality measures, we 
assume that pHC  and sHC  vary simultaneously at the same rate, i.e. the 
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latter is proportional to the former.52 This is equivalent to assume that 
1, ≤λλ= ps HCHC  and to take the first derivative with respect to pHC . 
With standard deviation it corresponds to the case of 
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The first order derivative can be signed as follows  
 
 ( ) 2
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2
0.. 2
22
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which is similar to the result obtained in equation (A.2). Thus educational 
inequality (as measured by standard deviation) increases under massive 
schooling up to the point when pHC  passes the threshold of ½, and the 
declines. Therefore, even with three groups of population we replicate the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between educational inequality and 
educational achievement. 
Analogously the Gini index on educational attainment can be obtained as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
HC
HCHCHCnHCHCn
HC
HCHCHCnHCHCHCn
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211 −−+−
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+−++
=
 (A.10) 
 
Using the same device previously introduced (namely that 
1, ≤λλ= ps HCHC ), we can proceed to study the dynamical evolution of 
educational inequality 
 
 
( )
0
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Passing now to actual income 
 
                                                 
52 This is obviously an approximation, since education is a sequential process, and we 
cannot have a simultaneous expansion of enrolment in secondary school unless we have 
previously observed a similar increase in primary school enrolment. However, an 
expansion of primary education enrolment is very likely to induce an expansion in 
secondary education enrolment after some time. Similar results can be obtained when 
assuming that both pHC  and sHC  rise at the same growth rate λ : in such a case the first 
derivative with respect to λ  has to be taken into account. 
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where the iβˆ  have been redefined accordingly. Assuming again that 
1, ≤λλ= ps HCHC , further define  
 
( ) 2ˆ21ˆ,ˆˆ λβ+λ−β=λβ+β= spsp BA  
 
Now the Gini index on income inequality appears as 
p
pp
y HCA
HCBHCA
Gini
⋅+
⋅−⋅
=
1
2
. Thus the first order derivative with respect to 
pHC  is 
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which is positive whenever ( )( ) 2/12ˆ21ˆ −λβ+λ−β< sppHC .  
As long as ( )( ) ( ) 01ˆˆ21ˆˆˆ 22 ≥λ−β≅λβ+λ−β⇔β≅β pspsp  . As a 
consequence, for low values of pHC  an increase in schooling rises income 
inequality; subsequently the relationship reverts to negative. This is 
analogous to previous result with just two subgroups of population. 
 
 64
Figure 1 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
Educational achievements and income inequality
means - weights=population
G
i
n
i
 
i
n
d
x
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
t
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t
 average years of school  Gini indx educational attainmen
 Gini indx incomes 
oecd
0
9
nt.afr.me sb.sah.afr
20
87
south asia
0
9
east asia lat.amer.
60 95
20
87
cent.pl.ec
60 95
0
9
entire world
60 95
20
87
 65
Figure 2 
per capita incomeinequality in education
inequality 
in incomes
average
 human
 capital
 
 66
Figure 3 
Basic relationships
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
Dynamics of inequality in incomes and education
means - weights=population
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